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conveying information about legal services 
that is more conducive to reflection and 
the exercise of choice on the part of the 
consumer." Zauderer, 105 S.Ct. at 2277. 
Ohio argued that a prophylactic rule 
was needed to prohibit attorneys from 
using legal advice in false or misleading 
advertisements. However, the Supreme 
Court found that the prophylactic ban 
was not the least restrictive way to secure 
the state's interests in preventing public 
deception. The Supreme Court noted that 
the Federal Trade Commission carries out 
a similar mission in eliminating unfair or 
deceptive advertisements in commerce, and 
found that distinguishing deceptive from 
nondeceptive -legal-advertisements would 
be no more difficult. Id. at 2278-80. The 
Court concluded that an attorney--lPay not 
be disciplined for soliciting legal business 
through printed advertising containing 
truthful and nondeceptive information 
and advice regarding the legal rights of 
others. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court struck 
down Ohio's restrictions on the use of il-
lustrations in attorney advertisements. 
The Court noted that "the use of illustra-
tions or pictures in advertisements serves 
important communicative functions: it at-
tracts the attention of the audience to 
the advertiser's message, and it may also 
serve to impart information directly." Id. 
at 2280. Since commercial illustrations 
are entitled to the first amendment pro-
tection of verbal commercial speech, the 
state had the burden of showing a sub-
stantial government interest justifying the 
restriction. The Court found that the 
state's interest that attorneys maintain 
dignity did not justify the abridgement of 
their first amendment rights. Further-
more, since advertising could be policed 
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on a case-by-case basis, the prophylactic 
ban on all illustrations in printed attorney 
advertisements was unconstitutional. 
Zauderer finally challenged the state's 
disclosure requirements in contingent fee 
advertisements. Under the Ohio disci-
plinary rules, an attorney must state that 
the client may have to bear certain ex-
penses even if he loses. Zauderer felt this 
compulsion violated his first amendment 
rights. The Supreme Court found that 
since commercial speech was principally 
justified by its value to consumers, Zau-
derer's protected interest in not providing 
factual information in his advertising was 
minimal, and his interest was adequately 
protected by the requirement that the dis-
closures be reasonably related to the 
state's interest in preventing deception of 
consumers. The Court then found that 
the Ohio requirement of disclosure in 
contingent fee ads was rationally related 
to the state's goals. The Court noted that 
a layman may not be aware of the distinc-
tion between "legal fees" and "costs," and 
may wrongfully feel that he will entail 
no expenses. The Court concluded that 
Ohio's ruling was reasonable enough to 
support a requirement of disclosure, and 
did not violate the first amendment. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Zau-
derer protects an attorney's first amend-
ment right to advertise, yet recognizes the 
state's interest in protecting the public 
from deception. While the state may no 
longer issue blanket bans to prevent an at-
torney from offering legal advice or using 
illustrations in printed advertisements, 
the state may evaluate these ads on a case-
by-case basis in order to ensure that the 
ads are not deceptive. The state may also 
compel the disclosure of specific informa-
tion to prevent an ad from being decep-
tive. As attorneys begin to exercise their 
constitutional rights, they should be aware 
of the potential of the state to create an 
advertising review board, and should en-
deavor to prevent deceptive printed ad-
vertisements from entering into the mar-
ketplace of ideas. 
- Lawrence M. Meister 
Virgil v. "Kash N'Karry": 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT IN PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY 
In a case of first impression, the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland has ruled 
that circumstantial evidence, in a prod-
ucts liability action, is sufficient to estab-
lish the existence of a defect, thereby en-
abling the case to survive motions for a 
directed verdict and reach the jury. In 
Virgil v. "Kash N'Karry" Service Corpora-
tion, 61 Md. App. 23, 484 A.2d 652 (1984), 
the court reversed in part a directed ver-
dict, at the close of the claimant's case, en-
tered by the Circuit Court for Howard 
County Guy J. Cicone, J. in favor of the 
defendant manufacturer, Aladdin Indus-
tries, Incorporated and seller, "Kash 
N'Karry" Service Corporation. The court 
reversed the trial court with respect to the 
implied warranty of merchantability and 
strict liability in tort counts. The counts 
sounding in negligence, including failure 
to warn, were affirmed by the court. 
The factual circumstances of the case 
involved the implosion of a pint-size 
thermos purchased at "Kash N'Karry" 
two or three months prior to the accident. 
Testimony by the plaintiff, Irma Virgil, 
revealed that the thermos was filled with 
coffee and a small amount of milk every 
weekday morning. The thermos was then 
carried to work, either by its handle or in 
a bag containing her shoes. On Saturdays, 
the thermos was carried downstairs to her 
den, where the plaintiff spent the day 
studying. 
Mrs. Virgil cleaned the thermos by fill-
ing it at night with a solution of baking 
soda and warm water. In the morning, 
she would wash the thermos with a bottle 
brush. The label bore the words, "Easy to 
Keep Clean," but there were no instruc-
tions on how to clean the thermos or what 
constituted a normal manner of cleansing 
the thermos. One Saturday morning the 
thermos imploded, causing the hot coffee 
and glass to be spewn into the face and 
eye of Mrs. Virgil. Mrs. Virgil testified 
that she did not drop, misuse, abuse, or 
damage the thermos in any way, but the 
plaintiff failed to present any expert "to 
give any scientific explanation for the im-
plosion." !d. at 27, 484 A.2d at 654. 
The defendants, during the motion for 
a directed verdict and the appeal, main-
tained that the plaintiff had failed to 
present any evidence that the thermos was 
defective at the time it was purchased. As 
the court explained, 
[t]o recover on either theory-implied 
warranty or strict liability-the plain-
tiff in a products liability case must 
satisfy three basics from an evidentiary 
standpoint: (1) the existence of a de-
fect, (2) the attribution of the defect 
to the seller, and (3) a causal relation 
between the defect and the injury. 
!d. at 30, 484 A.2d at 656. 
Thus, the crux of the case became 
whether the plaintiff's testimony, with re-
gard to her proper handling of the ther-
mos during the two-to-three month period 
between purchase and implosion, satisfied 
the "plaintiff's burden to establish that it 
is more probable than not that the defect 
existed at the time of sale." !d. at 32, 484 
A.2d at 657. 
The court held that the plaintiffs met 
their burden in this case. Initially, the 
court rejected the defendant's contention 
that expert testimony was needed to es-
tablish a defect stating, 
[e]xpert testimony is hardly necessary 
to establish that a thermos bottle that 
explodes or implodes when coffee or 
milk are poured into it is defective. 
When a product fails to meet the rea-
sonable expectations of the user, "The 
inference is that there was some sort 
of a defect, a precise definition of 
which is unnecessary." 
[d. at 31, 484 A.2d at 656 (citing Heaton v. 
Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 
806 (1967». 
The court then discussed the sufficiency 
of the evidence presented. As stated in 
Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md. 
App. 226, 437 A.2d 242 (1981), proofofa 
defect must rise above surmise, conjec-
ture or speculation, emphasizing that re-
covery can not be based on the presump-
tion of the accident happening. Dean 
Prosser, though, in The Fall of the Cita-
del, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791,843-844 (1966), 
declared that the addition of (Ivery little 
more in the way of other facts . . . may be 
enough" to give rise to an inference that 
product is defective from the mere occur-
rence of an accident. 
With the above analysis in mind, the 
court held that, "[a]n inference of a defect 
may be drawn from the happening of an 
accident, where circumstantial evidence 
tends to eliminate other causes, such as 
product misuse or alteration." Virgil, 61 
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The court distinguished the case sub 
judice from Jensen, supra. Jensen involved 
the loss of control of an automobile al-
legedly due to a defect in the steering 
mechanism where the only evidence pro-
duced was the plaintiffs' testimony that 
he heard the tires squeal. The court stated 
that the plaintiffs in Jensen failed to ne-
gate other causes of the accident. 
In the area of products liability, involv-
ing the theories of strict liability and im-
plied warranty of merchantibility, the 
holding in this case has the potential to 
provide a "windfall" to plaintiffs. The 
practical effect of the decision will be to 
shift the essential burden of proof to the 
defendant. As it stands now, the plaintiff 
is required to testify that he bought the 
product and that he did not misuse or 
alter the product, thus, effectively shift-
ing to the defendant the burden of prov-
ing that the causal effect of the accident 
was not produced by the defendant. 
The decision has further eroded the rule 
of caveat emptor. With regard to strict 
liability, it now appears that in order to 
reach the jury, who most often will side 
with the injured plaintiff, evidence of an 
accident which injured the plaintiff is 
needed; coupled with the plaintiff's heart-
felt assurances that he did not misuse, 
alter or even touch the product (i.e., "all 
of a sudden, it just blew up") will be suffi-
cient proof. This case takes the position 
that a plaintiff's testimony will not be 
self-serving. It may be too much to ask of 
an injured party. 
- Kevin L. Beard 
New Hampshire v. Piper: OPENS 
DOORS TO BAR ADMISSION 
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. 
Piper, 105 S.Ct. 1272 (1985), the United 
States Supreme Court held that New 
Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42, 
which limits bar admission to state resi-
dents, violated the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, article IV, section 2, clause 1. By this 
ruling, the Court has affected the residency 
requirements for lawyers in at least twenty-
seven states. Low, Lawyer Residency Re-
quirement Axed by Supreme Court, The 
Daily Record, Mar. 12, 1985 at 4, col. 3. 
However, Maryland is not one of the states 
affected by this ruling. See, e.g., Rule 10 of 
Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of 
Maryland (deleted Jan. 22, 1982). 
In Piper, the appellee, Kathryn Piper, a 
resident of a town in Vermont, which was 
located about 400 yards from the New 
Hampshire border, passed the New Hamp-
shire bar examination in 1980. She was in-
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formed by the New Hampshire Board of 
Bar Examiners, however, that before she 
could practice law in the state of New 
Hampshire she would have to become a 
resident of New Hampshire pursuant to 
New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42. 
Appellee requested from the Clerk of the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court a dispen-
sation from the residency requirement, ex-
plaining that her personal situation ne-
gated the convenience of becoming a New 
Hampshire resident. The Clerk denied 
appellee's request. Piper than petitioned 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court for 
permission to become a member of the 
bar. The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
denied her request. The appellee filed the 
present action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Hamp-
shire. The court ruled in 1982 that the 
New Hampshire residency requirement 
violated the privileges and immunities 
clause. New Hampshire v. Piper, 539 F. 
Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982). The Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the 
ruling. New Hampshire v. Piper, 723 F.2d 
110 (1st Cir. 1983). 
The Court in Piper begins by discussing 
the intent of the privileges and immunities 
clause. The clause, according to the Court, 
was intended to "fuse into one Nation 
a collection of independent, sovereign 
States." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 
395 (1948). Consequently, it is "[0 Jnly with 
respect to those 'privileges' and 'immuni-
ties' bearing on the vitality of the nation as 
a single entity that a State must accord resi-
dents and nonresidents equal treatment." 
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 
436 U.S. 371,383 (1978). Therefore, the 
privileges and immunities clause only pro-
tects fundamental rights. 
The Court determined that practicing 
law is a fundamental right protected by 
that clause. First, one of the purposes of 
the clause is "to create a national economic 
union." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1276. Since 
"the practice oflaw is important to the na-
tional economy," it is a fundamental right 
which is protected. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 
1277. Second, the practice oflaw is a fun-
damental right because in cases where "un-
popular federal claims" are raised "repre-
sentation by nonresident counsel may be 
the only means available for the vindica-
tion offederal rights." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 
1277. 
In addition, the Court noted that the 
practice oflaw does not involve an exercise 
of state power as in In re Gnffiths, 413 
U.S. 717 (1973), justifying a residency 
requirement. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1278. In-
stead, a lawyer is a private businessman 
and not "an 'officer' of the State in any po-
litical sense." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1278. 
Although the Court determined that 
practicing law is a fundamental right, the 
state can still discriminate against non-
residents where: "(i) there is a substantial 
reason for the difference in treatment; and 
(ii) the discrimination practiced against 
nonresidents bears a substantial relation-
ship to the State's objective." Piper, 105 
S.Ct. at 1279. The Court determined, how-
ever, that New Hampshire did not show 
substantial reasons that were substantially 
related to the state's objective to discrim-
inate against nonresident attorneys. First, 
"[tJhere is no evidence to support the State's 
claim that nonresidents might be less likely 
to keep abreast of local rules and proce-
dures." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1279. Second, 
"there is no reason to believe that a non-
resident lawyer will conduct his practice 
